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IN THE SUPREME COU.RT
of the

STATE OF UTAH
~IILLEH.~' ~rr·rrL~AL

INSlTRANCE

.\SSOCI ..\TION,

Plai.ntiff and Appellant,
Case No. 9996

-vs.-

lft.JLIXE TRANSP'ORT, INC.,
Defendant and Respondent .

.A.PPELLANT'S BRIEIF
ST~\TEMENT
ST.\TE~[}~X1,

OF FACIT•S

OF TilE

KI~D

OF CAS·E

ThiB iB an. aetion for recovery of a subroga~ion claim
arising out of a collision \vhere the automobile of the
plaintifr·~ in~ured ""as totally destroy~d by the admitted
nt?g-ligence of the defendant in driving defendant's large
truck onto the ""I~ong ~ide of the highway.

The rase \\~as submitted to the trial judge on a written stipulation of fact·, and \vritten memorandums of authority. Frotn a judgn1ent of no cause of action, plaintiff
appeal~.
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RELIEF SOUGH'T ON AP'PEAL
Plaintiff seeks reversal of the judgment, and judgnlent in its favor as a matter of law, or that failing, a new
trial.

STATE:.\IENT OF F AC'TS
This appeal arises from an accident which occurred
on High\vay 40 near Stra\\~berry Reservoir,
asatC'h
County, l~tah, on ~1:ay 17, 1960. It is admitted that
the defendant Hi-Line Transport, Inc., negligently drove
a large Peterbilt diesel truck and semi-trailer loaded with
bricks onto the \vrong side of the highway and hy this
negligence caused the truck to strike head on and totally
demolish a new Buick owned by Donald Ray1ner, a fact
observed and known by defendant. The appellant herein,
Millers' l\1 utual Insurance Association, insured the Buick
and paid $33-±0.50 less deductible of $50.00 and salvage of
$648.50 for a net loss of $2642.00, becoming subrogated
to the claim of $2642.00. (Record 20, para. -±).It is stipulated that the negligence of defendant Hi-Line Transport,
Inc., (hereafter referred to as Tortfeasor or Hi-Line)
\\~as thP sole proxi1nate cause of the collision and da1nage
(Record 22, para. 15.). Hi.JL~ine thereby became liable to
the .:\ ppe llant for $~()4-:2.00.

'T

This case presents an effort by the TortfeasorRespondent, Hi-Line 'Transport, Inc., to evade the liability for the subrogation claim.
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II i-1 Jine earried liability insurance with Central
ca~unlt y InsuraiH'e Cotnpany. (Record 13, 23-26, 20 para.
I ).

Hy thP insuring agree1nent (Record 13 and 23-26)
I-Ii-Line Transport, Inc. constituted Central Casualty
l'otnpany the agent of Hi-Line Transport, Inc. to "make
:-;uch in\·Pstigation, negotiation and settlement of any suit
a:-; it (lPPtns expediPnt." (Record 13 and 24, Insuring
.\~n·PnlPnt, paragraph II a).

By its actions after the accident Hi-Line further confirnu.•(l and constituted Central Casualty Company and
its reprPsPntatives as the agents of Hi-Line to handle
t lw nPg-otiation and adjustment of the claim by entrusting
to c~·ntral Casualty Company and its organization of ad.in:-;tprs. invPstigators and attorneys the responsibility
for aet ing for and on behalf of Hi-Line by:
(a)

Giving Central Casualty Company and its
r~prt·~PntativPs notice of the accident pursuant to the
poliey. (Reeord 13 and 25, Conditions Paragraph 1).
(b) Referring to Central Casualty Company and
it:-; representativPs the rlaims and suits of Appellant~ubrogee and of RaYJner, pursuant to the policy. (Record 13 and :25, Conditions, Para. 2).
(e) Cooperating fully in having Central Casualty
Con1pany and its representative handle the claims and
:'Hit~ pursuant to the poliry (Record 13 and 26, Condition~. para. lS).
The . .\ppellant-Subrogee demanded payment of the
Tortf~·a~~n· and "yas referred to the insurance adjusters
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
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for Hi-Line, Homer Bray Service, Inc., which was entrusted with the responsibility of negotiating and adjusting the Tortfeasor's liability.
Raymer sued the Hi-Line in Salt Lake County for
only the $50.00 deductible portion of the loss to the new
Buick, \vhich was da1naged so badly as to be beyond repair, along with l~ay111er's personal injuries. (Record 21,
para. 8). The co1nplaint in the Salt Lake County action
was served upon Hi-Line Transport, Inc., and the complaint gave full and further reminder and notice to HiLine that Raymer's claim in the Salt Lake County suit
did not include the subrogation claim for damage paid by
the collision carrier for Mr. Raymer.
Raymer's attorney, Glen M. Hatch, prior to filing
suit advised the subrogee, Millers' Mutual Insurance Association, of the projected suit and inquired about the
subrogee's intentions concerning suit. To determine
whether suit \Yas necessary to recover on the subrogation
claim subrogee therl·upon \vrote a letter to Homer Bray
Service, Inc. (Record :27) \\'"herein the Subrogee stated
its understanding that Central Casualty Company was
handling the 1natter for Hi-Line T·ransport, Inc., and inquired whether Hi-Line's agent would give due consideration to the subrogation claim after having disposed of
tht• personal injury action. The subrogee indicated it
\\'"ould sue unless it \vas assured that its claim would be
dealt with separately on the merits after Raymer's litigation. 'The subrogee stated, Hin the absence of some assurance that Central Casualty will consider our subroga-
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tion at'tPr the other cases are out of the way, we will
naturally be forced to take other action to protect our
intt~r.. ~t~.'' (Record 27).
llotuer Bray Service, Inc. (acting under the agent's
authority provided in iii-Line's policy, and pursuant to
the authority ari~ing fron1 the acts of the Tortfeasor in
turning the investigation, adjustment and negotiation
o\"<'1' to the personnel, organization and apparatus maintainl'd hy Central Casualty Company for that purpose)
replied to the subrogee by letter. (Record 28). Therein
HotnPr Bray Service, Inc., as representative of the Tortfpa~or·~ intt'l't'~t~, acknowledged the subrogee's claim, reqlll'~tl'd proof as to the details and the amount, and indicatt'd that the subrogated claim would be considered separatPly on it~ 1nerits upon the termination of the personal injury claim.
Hi-Line's agent wrote to the Subrogee (Record 28):
"'This 'vill acknowledge receipt of your letter
of February 17, 1961 and we shall appreciate reeei\ing photostatic copy of your Proof of Loss together "~ith the draft in payment.
e have not been able to
HYou are correct.
di~pose of the injury claims and when they ar~
out of the 1cay zoe 1cill certainly be more than
happy to give your subrogation claim consideraf £o·n. (E1nphasis- added.)

'T

HThanking you for your cooperation... " etc.
Acting in reliance on the above representation of HiLin(\\~ agent the .....-\ppellant-Subrogee in good· faith ret'rainPd front joining its claim in the Raymer suit in Salt
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Lake County, and advised ~Ir. Hatch accordingly. HiLine, represented by L. E. l\lidgley, defended the Salt
Lake County suit, "Therein it \Yas apparent that the subrogation claim \Yas not included. No move was ever made
in the Salt Lake County action to join the Subrogee, and
no notice was ever given the subrogee during the pendency of the Salt Lake County action that the promise to
consider the subrogation claim separately and later on
its merits 'vould not be honorPd on completion of the Salt
Lake County action.
The Salt Lake County action ended in a verdict for
Raymer and against Hi-Line Transport, Inc. and the
judgment \vas paid. The subrogee, l\liller's Mutual Insurance Association, then requested payment of the
subrogation claim. The claim of the subrogee was now
rejected because it \vas ·~attempting to split a cause of
action."
(Record 29). In the meanwhile, Central Casualty Company \vent into receivership, and the Tortfeasor, Hi-Line Transport, lne. refused to recognize ib
liability to the subrogee. Hi-Line Transport, Inc., having
accepted the benefits of the actions of Central Casualty
Con1pany and the adjusters and attorneys in investigating, negotiating and defending its claims rejected the
obligations arising from its agents' actions.
~fillers' ~I utual

Insurance Association therefore had
~lr. Hatch file the present \\T asatch County action from
'"·hich this appeal arises.
1Tpon refusal of Hi-Line to pay the subrogated claim,
subrogee, pursuant to 31-5-15 UCA, 1953, instituted suit
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in the nntne of Donald
{ltPeo rd 1) :

~L

RaytnPr as provided by statute

:~ 1-.-l-13. ~arne in "·hich business conducted ~ubrogation-Liinitations on assumption of na1ne.
( 1) I~~aeh insurer shall conduct its business in its

o\\·n legal name, except that in subrogation actions
it tnay sue in the name of its assured.

By <·onrt order plaintiff-subrogee later appeared by
it~

own natne. (Record 18).

ThP t'aet~ \VPre not in dispute in the Wasatch County
ease. and it appeared to involve only a legal question :
\Ya~

the Tortfeasor-Respondent relieved of
it~ liability to the plaintiff on the subrogation
claim by reason of the fact that Homer Bray
Sl\rvieP, Inc. by its representation induced the
subrogee to refrain from joining its subrogation
rlai1n in the Salt Lake County action~
Trial counsel therefore submitted the issue to the
trial court upon a "'"ritten stipulation of facts (Record
~0. ~1, :2:2) and men1orandums of legal authority.

By Inemorandum Hi-Line argued to the trial court:
(a) The Tortfeasor 'vas not bound by the actions
of thn~P to \\~hon1 it had entrusted the responsibility to
act in TortfPasor's behalf to investigate, negotiate and
dt\fend the clain1s, though it had accepted the benefits
nf tho~p actions. (Record 50-52).
(b) That only one cause of action existed, and the
rule against splitting n cause of action 'vas strict, absolut\·, 'Yithout exe.eption, and not subject to 'vaiver or esSponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
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toppel by actions of a defendant-tortfeasor's agents.
(Record 49-50).
(c) That the Salt Lake County action (in which AppPllant-Subrogee was not a party and from ''Thich the
subrogation claim with the knowledge of all concerned
was o1nitted) though it found Hi-Line liable, was res
judicata on the subrogation claim. (Record 46-48).
The trial court accepted defendant's view of the law.
The trial court, after finding facts as stipulated (Record
35) concluded as a matter of law (Record 35) :
1. The Salt Lake County action constituted res
judicata of the subrogation claim.
2. The Wasatch County action attempted to split a
cause of action.
3. Neither Defendant-Tortfeasor nor defendant's
insurance company "consented that plaintiff's cause of
action be split."
Appellant-Subrogee contends the trial cou:r;t \vas misf!•l1 i/P..SIDn,.S ~ /£-~
led into error of la,v, that the finding C S d are contrary to thP facts and the la,v, and that appellant is entitled to judg1nent as a matter of law.

POINT ONE
PLAINTIFF-APPELLAN'T MADE NO IMPROPER ATTEMPT TO S'PLIT A OAUSE OF ACTION.

'Vith tlH\ great increase in auto insurance and related litigation in recent decades practically all jurisdic-
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tion~ hn vP rP<·ognizPd in one 'vay or another that so1ne

insurntH'l' subrogation clai1ns n1ust in justice and equity
;-;nnwtitnP~ hP tried in separab~ actions from the clai1n of
tht~ in~HI'P<l.

Paragraph ~' Conclusions of Law (Record 35) is contrary to the fact and the la,v. The trial court erred in
al'et'pting defendant's contention that the subrogation
al'tion n1ust ahvays without exception be adjudicated in
the ~'utll' action as the owner's damages .
. \. That an insurance subrogation claim may be
t rt'ated separately is recognized by the well-established
rule that a tort-fL'asor or his representative with knowledge of the existence of subrogation rights by the other
party·~ insurer n1ay not defeat that right by any type of
~l'ttle1nent 'Yith the insured without the insurer's consent.
HiThe right of subrogation accruing to an insuranee company to recover from a tort-feasor,
through 'Yhose negligence the loss was incurred,
the runount paid on its policy of insurance, is not
barred by a settlement bet,veen the tort-feasor and
the o'vner for a sum less than the actual liability
of the forn1er, and for 'vhich the latter gave a full
release, for such a release is a fraud upon the subrogee ''"hich 'vill be no defense either at law or in
l\quity to its action to recover the loss remaining
unsati~fied after applying to its action to recover
the loss re1naining unsatisfied after applying to
it~ ~atisfaction the su1n paid by the tort-feasor."
1-,;re .Assn. of Plzila. v. Wells, 8-! N.J. Eq. 484, 94 A.
ti19, L.R.A.. 91ti.A.• 1:2SO, Ann. Cas. 1917A 1296. See also
Ca1nden Fire Ins ...:1ss'n. r. Preziozo, 93 X.J. Eq. 48~, 116
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
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A. 694 ( 1922,). Both ca~es have been much quoted and
followed.
""The right of subrogation is based upon principles of equity and natural justice, and courts
have liberally applied the principles of subrogation for the protection of those \Yho are its natural
beneficiaries."
Bahn v. Shaler, D. C. niun. App., 125 A. 2d 67~
(1956).
See also City of r/ ezr York Ins. Co. r. Tice, 159 Kan.
176, 152 P. 2d 836 (1944); Pittsburgh C., C. & St. L. Ry.
Co. v. Home Ins. Co. of New York, 183 Ind. 335,108 N.E.
525 (1915); Potomac Ins. Co. 1;. JJ!acNaughton, 77 N.Y.S.
2d 110,191 ~lise. 362 ( 1948) ; Ocean Ace. & Guarantee
Corp. 1:. Hooker Electrochrnzical Co., 240 N.Y. 37, 147
N.E. 351 (1925); Security Storage & Van Co. r. General
Ins. Co., Tex. Civ. App., 310 S.W. 2d 729 (1958).

B. Some jurisdictions hold the subrogee has a separate cause of action.
In J/idelity & Guaranty Fire Corporation t~. Silrcr
Fleet il1 otor E.rp., 242 Ala. 559, 7 So. 2d 290 (1942) (subrogee of da1nage clai1n to truck sued tortfeasor after owner of truck had sued and recovered da1nage to cargo) the
court upheld the right of the insurer to sue as subrogee
in a subsequent action, follo,ving Underwriters at Lloyd's
Ins. Co. r. T'ickslnrrg Traction Co., 106 ~1iss. 255, 63 So.
4:J3, 51 L.R.A., N.S. 319 (1913):
"There \\'"ere then tu~o distinct causes of action, t\\'"O separate rights to recover, in t\vo different persons.'" (emphasis added).

Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

11

.. PotPntially, the in~Ul'<'l' had an interest in the
•·:t rg·o, as again~t a tort-f(•asor, \\·hen the injury
occurred. Basi<'ally Pvery on(~ should have his
day in ('ourt in fa<'t, not InerPly hy a nominal party
not intPrP~t<'d in protecting his interest.
"()n sn<'h rPasoning, \\·e eonf'lude the doctrine
ot' ~plitting a cause of action is not applicable
hen•."

S Coueh on Insurance (First Ed. 1959 R.eprint), §
~U~9. page (j(i(i7 ~tatPs tlH· rule as follo\VS:

X or is an insurer of an automobile, \Yhich,
in a<'cordaneP \rith a provision of the policy, had
bProine ~nbrogated to the claim of the owner for
drunage thereto against the \Vrongdoer before the
in~titution by such o\vner of a suit for personal
injuriP~. growing out of the same accident, in
"·hieh a judgment had been recovered, precluded
thPrehy from 1naintaining an action on the theory
that the injury to the automobile and the personal
injuriP~ constituted but one cause of action, and
eould not be split so that separate suits could be
brought: since, \vhen the the owner of the automobile instituted suit for his injuries, he had no cause
of action for da1nage to the automobile, this right
of action having been transferred to the insurer
in pursuanct> of the conditions of the policy, so
that the t\vo causes \Yere then in different per~ons .. ,
H

29.A....-\111. J ur .. InsurancP, § 1734-, p. 811 states:
··. . . an insurer of an automobile who has, in
accordance "~ith a provision of the policy, become
:'Ubrogated to the elaim of the owner for damages
thereto against a tortfeasor before the institution
by ~neh o""ller of a suit for personal injuries gro\vSponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
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ing out of the same accident, in which a judg1uent
has been recovered, is not precluded thereby fro1n
maintaining an action."
The case of General E.rchange Insurance Corporation c. lyoung, Jl!o. App., 206 S.W. 2d 683 (19-!7) involved
a suit by a plaintiff-subrogee against the tortfeasor. Previously the plaintiff's insured had brought suit for pPrsonal injury and secured a settle1nent from the liabilit~·
carrier of the tortfeasor-defendant. The release signed
by the plaintiff's insured was a broad general release specifically including the property damage upon which the
subrogee based its claim. The evidence indicated that
the tortfeasor was not specifically informed about the
subrogation, but that a representative of the defendant's
liability insurance company kne'v about the subrogation
rights. 'The court held that the defendant through his
liability carrier and the agents of the liability carrier had
impliedly consented to the splitting of the cause of action
and that the plaintiff-subrogee should prevail. The court
stated (page 689):
Any other result "\Yould be rt~pugnant to th<'
general principle of equity upon which the courts
have ahvays held the right of subrogation rests.
If not adopted ... the wrongdoer and his insurance carrier "~auld go scot free of liability for
da1nage to the auto1nobile, and Ella Sw·isher 'vho
suffered the damage would ultimately receive no
compensation therefor. It would also place a preJniunz on fraud aud dishonesty.'' (en1phasis added)
u

~.ehe

Supre1ne Court concluded by saying:
'~ ... (T)he facts in the instant case furnish
a reasonable exception to the rule against split-
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ting; or perhaps; it is more accurate to say there
has been 'llO split of the cause of action, but the
cr('at ion of two separate ca~tses of action. (empha~is added) .
.. 'rhe husiness of insuring o"\vners of n1otor
vehiclPs against property damage by collision, is
lPgitimate, useful, and \Yidespread. By the insuranee contract, before any cause of action accrues,
t hP insured obligates itself to pay the owner any
property da1nages he may suffer under the conditions of the policy, with the right of subrogation
to the insurer as to any such damages caused by
the fault of another. 'Thus the insurer stands altnost1 but not quite, in the relation of surety to the
insured. ..:\t the moment an insured vehicle is damagP<l or destroyed by the fault of a third person
the insurer has a contingent interest in any reCOVl\ry of da1nages to the extent of its liability
to the o'vner. That interest becomes a vested right
to reimbursement from the third person when the
i n~urer discharges its policy obligation to the
.
d. . . . "
Insure
C. ()ther jurisdictions hold that the insurance subrogation ~ituation constitutes an established exception
to the rule against splitting a cause of action.
In Rosenthal v. Scott, Fla., 150 So. 2d 43B
\ Dl~l'. ti. 1961; on rehearing, Feb. 22, 1963) the Supreme
Court of Florida con1pletely reversed its decision on first
ht'nring and ruled that .even though the subrogee~insurer
of the injured party had filed suit for d;;tmages to the
autotnobile of the insured's automobile, had had the suit
di~nu~:'Pd "~ith prejudice, the insured might nevertheless
hring a ~eparate action against the same alleged tortSponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
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feasor for injuries to his person. ThP court did not l'Pnounce the rigid doctrine that there shall not be splitting
of a cause of action, but held that the peculiar circumstances of an automobile indemnity subrogation 1nade
it absolutely necessary in the interests to allow the subrogor and the subrogee to bring separate actions:
""We again recognize the 1najorit~· rulP against
splitting a cause of action, but we do not belit V(
that said rule is controlling under the facts of this
case. The application of said rule herein without
recognizing the· insurance exception 1Dould in our
judgment defeat the ends of justice ... Oft'times,
\vhen an automobile accident results in property
damage and personal injuries the ultimate extent
of the personal injuries, as opposed to the amount
of the property damages, may not be readily ascertainable. So long as the magnitude of the injuries to the person are known before the expiration of the statutory period within which a tort
action may be begun by the person whose property
""as damaged and \Yho suffered personal injuries
should be permitted to 1naintain a suit against the
\\'"rong-doer regardless of the fact that he may
have, under the exigencies of the situation, settled
\vith an insurance carrier the matter of property
da1nages." (Emphasis added.)
1

1

The court further stated:
"To hold that under such circumstances the
innocent party had split his cause of ~c~io~ a~d
waived his right to sue for personal InJUries IS
unthinkable If a so-called subrogated insurer must
wait for perhaps several years to recover the
1noney darnage or by filing its claim can force ~he
hz)1prrd person to bring a personal injury act1on
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JJI't•nut!Hrcly, before the total extcut of his injur-

it:s arc know 11, the 11, au d in that event there is
sornet hi 11 !1 tc ro 11 !J II' i th the huo. We can not be
persuaded that u·e shollld create a truisn~ out of
th(' hackucyed .satr: ·Jt's alllazo aud no justice.'"
( l d. at page 43S.) ( E1nphasis added.)
"TltP underlying rl~ason for the rule against
~plitti.ng a cause of action is salutary. The rule
ha~ a~ its purposP, as every student of the law
kno\\·~, ~that litigation should have an end and
that no pPr~on should be unnecessarily harassed

with a multiplicity of suits.' However, a rule such
as the one under consideration should not be decia n·d rigid, inflc.rible, and inexorable when such
dt·claratiou would in 1nany, ;nany instances, for
the only of cout~·cuicnce to a putative wrongdoer,
defeat the r11ds of justice" (Emphasis added.)
\\\\rP "~e to adhere to said rule and declare
it to be unyielding in this case, or in any other
ea~P 'Yith a silnilar factual setting, '""e would, in
our judgn1ent, be guilty of making a mockery of
t hP funda1nental purpose of all courts in this
country-administration of simple, 'even-handed'
'

4

ju~tice.

'• Every court in this land in spirit if not in
fact ha~ emblazoned OYPr its portal in box-car
lPtter~: ·Fiat Justicia.' ''Te pray it may ever renlain ~o:· (I d. at pages -±39·-440.)
The reasoning of the Florida Supreme c·ourt in
Rosenthal l\ Scott raises an interesting question in Utah
'vhere the property damage is subject to a three year
~tatute of li1nitations and personal injuries are subject
to a four year ~tatnte of li1nitations. If separate subrogation :-:nit t'annot be brought in l~tah, under the theory that
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there are actually two causes of action, or that the situation constitutes an exception to the rule against splitting one cause of action, or that the tortfeasor is estopped
to assert such a defense, \vhat must the subrogee do
"'here the insured takes no action or waits until the
fourth year to commence action~

a.

Let the three year statute of limitations run on
the subrogation claim~

b.

Deprive the insured of the fourth year of the
statute of limitations by forcing suit within
three years~

c.

Sue but omit the insured's claim and risk giving
the tortfeasor defense against the insured of res
judicata or splitting a cause of action~

d.

Risk the accusation of barratory by urging or
stimulating the insured to bring suit~

In Hi-Line's 1ne1norandun1 "\Yhich led the trial court
into error, defendant cites as favoring its position
Travelers Indemnity Co. v. Jlloorc, 304 Ky. 456,201 S.W.
2d 7 (19·47). Actually, that case supports appellant.
There, as in this instant case, plaintiff paid for
property da1nage to its insured's automobile. The in·
sured sued defendant for personal injury and collected.
Plaintiff then sued defendant for the damage done to the
insured's automobile as subrogee of the insured. On appeal, the plaintiff prevailed, the court stating:
"Whether or not the exception to the rule
against splitting causes of action in favor of a
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subrogee so as to give hi1n an independent right
of action against the \Vrongdoer for the amount
he was eompelled to pay under his insurance contract, is onP of first impression in this court. But
thP reasoning of the minority of the courts so
declaring ilnpresses us as the more logical one,
and that the general rule against splitting single
causes of action is not one that is immune from
exceptions when under facts and conditions, as
appear in this case, the adoption is necessary to
completP protection and enforcement of the rights
of all part iPs ... " ( 201 S. -\V. 2d at Page 11).
CitPd "·ith approval in Sharp v. Bannon, Ky. App., 258
~.\Y. ~d 713 (1953).
Again, Iii-Line's 1nemorandum inadvertently misled
the trial court in citing Spargur v. Dayton Power and
Li_qht Co •. 7 Ohio Ops. 2·d 138, 152 N.E. 2d 918 (1958) as
~upporting defendant's claim that a subrogee may not
tnaintain an action for property damages after the
in~nrPd-~nhrogor has 1naintained an action for personal
injury. In fact the Ohio court held the exact opposite.
The Spargur case is somewhat involved, and a careful reading is necessary to grasp the holding of the court.
Hi-Line'~ n1en1orandum to the trial court lifted language
frotn its context of a broad discussion in such a way that
the quotation 1nisrepresented in its application to the
pr()~Pnt case of the la'v of Ohio as enunciated in Spargtttr
t'. Dayton Power & Light Co.
~·t~pon

further examination of the cases. from
other jurisdictions, it appears that in those instances "'"here the courts have held to a majority
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rule, a separate cause of action is ahnost universally recognized \vhere an insurer has acquirPd by
an assignment or by subrogation the right to recover for n1oney it has advanced to pay for property damage . . . . "
The quotation cited in Hi-Line's memorandum refers
to the fact that the assignee is bound by the drterinination of those issues decided in the case involving the assignor, in the ~pargur case the issues of negligence and
causation. The court in the Spargur case specifically upheld the right of a subrogee-assignee to maintain a separate action for damages against a tortfeasor when the
insured had already obtained a judgment against the
tortfeasor for personal injuries.
Spargur v. Dayton Power & Light Co., et al. (supra)
so far as the facts apply to those in this appeal, held thP
opposite of the meaning conveyed in defendant's memoranduin of authority to the trial court. !The holding of
the case as related to the facts on this appeal is accurately set forth in head note number 2:

"\\:--here a party suffering property damage
and personal injuries based upon same alleged
negligence recovers from insurer for property
damage, instead of having a separate cause of
action for property damage apart from personal
injury action, there exists only a separate right of
action exclusively in assignee to prosecute separate action against party causing injury for reimbursement for inde1nnity 1noneys paid under
insurance contract." (Emphasis added.)
'The court of course recognized that a particular injured party n1ay 1naintain one action against the tort-
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for all (laBtag-P~ rpsulting to that party resulting
front tht• wrongful aPt. This is a proposition about which

fpa:o:or

wt~ ar~· uot

in dispute in this action, ",.here we are concPrrH·d with thP right of an insuraneP subrogee to bring a
~~'}Htrat" a<'t ion under thP particular circumstances here
t~xi:-:t ing.
Tht~

Spargur suit \\,.a~ against multiple defendants,
tht• po\\·Pr and light co1npany on the one hand ('vhich 'vas
l'onn<l in thP n<'tion of thP insured for personal injuries
to hP liable hy n•ason of its negligence) and four other
dPfPndnnt~ on thP oth<·r hand who were builders and contr:H·tor~ ~found in the insured's action not to be negli.~·t•nt). Tht• ea~P of Spargur v. Dayton Power & Light Co.
allo\VPd the subrogee 'vho had paid property da1nage
to pro<•t•t~d ",.ith a second action against the power and
light COlllpany.
'rhe court held that one "'"ho acquires an interest in
a t:lainl aftl•r litigation has been commenced is in privity
\Vith the assignor and would be bound by the findings
and judgn1ent in the assignor's action. The court stated
(pagp D~7):

··Jn a subsequent action the insured and the
\vrongdoer are bound by a finding on the issue
of negligence and contributory negligence. If the

finding is adrerse to the wrongdoer, the court
1nerely assigns for trial the subject of the assignlnent or subrogation and the exteut of the d(nnOflt't'."

The court ~tated (page 927) :
··\\~here t'vo separate suits arise out of

a sin-
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gle cause of action but do not involve the same
claim the parties and their privies are not 'bound
by the judgment' but they may not relitigate similar issues and they may litigate those issues which
were not or could not have been resolved in the
original action. 32 Ohio J ur. 2d, 58'; 30 Amer.,
J ur. 403. In a subsequent action the insurer and
the wrongdoer are bound by the finding on an
issue of negligence and contributory negligence.
If the finding is adverse to the wrongdoer, the
court merely assigns for trial the subject of the
assignment or subrogation and the extent of the
damages."
Hi-Line has similarly completely misconstrued Section 84 of the Restatement of Judgments. The Ohio court
in the Spargur case interprets this section as binding
the assignee only with regard to negligence or contributory negligence and causation. The assignee may still
maintain a separate action for damages:
"It is logical and 'vell within public policy that
an adverse finding on either the issue of negligence or contributory negligence in the principal
action should estop the insurer in the separate
action." (152 N.E. 2d at page 927).
But note that the court upholds the insurer's right to
bring the •·separate action."
The correct interpretation of Section 84 of the Restatement of Judgments is seen when we read together
subsections (a) and (b) as quoted in the Spargur case:
" 'Where a judgment is rendered in an action
in 'vhich a party thereto properly acts on behalf
of another, the other is
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(a) bound by and entitled to the benefits of
the rules of res judicata with reference to
~uch of his intPrests as at the ti1ne are controll('d by the parf,IJ to the action;
(h) not bound by or entitled to the benefits

of thP rules of res judicata with referencP
to hi~ interests not controlled by the party
to fh(' action .' ,.,. (15:2 N.E. 2d at page 923.
En1phasis added.)

In thP

~pargur

easP, subsection (a) refers to the

i~~llt'~

of nPgligencP and contributory negligence. Sub~PI't ion (b) rPfPr~ to the subrogated property danzage
claim 'rhirh "·a~ not adjudicated by plaintiff-insured.
~·cprtainly

if the assignor acts for another
he 1nust account as trustee, however where the
a~~ ignor does not do so he should be required to
account for that ""hich he did not request and did
not rPreiYf\ uor under u·hat appears to be the existing law does the insurer lose his right of action
because the injured party failed to include the
assignee's interest." (152 N.E. 2d at pages 924925: emphasis added.)
The Ohio courts have followed the rule enunciated in
thll TraYelPr~ Inden1nity ease, supra, and the Spargur
~·a~t· ( ~npra). ~-\~ recently as April 24, 19'63, the court in
Dul)(>se r. Lnzce. :?3 Ohio Ops. 2d 373, 189 N.E. 2d 923,
rnlPd that plaintiffs release of defendant from liability
fnr pPr~nna l injuri~s did not bar his subrogated insurance
rotnpany from bringing an action for property damage
tn the in~nred's automobile. At page 925, the court states:

··. . . eYen though Ohio has adopted the single rause of action theory-that there is but one
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cause of action against a wrongdoer for injuries
caused one person by a tort, an exception will
be made for a subrogated insurer. . . . "
See also Hoosifr Casualty Co. v. Davis, 172 Ohio St.
5, 173 N.E. 2d 349 ( 1961) ; American Ins11rance Co. v.
Ellsworth Freight Lines, Inc., 113 Ohio App. 426, 178
N.E. 2d 819 (1960).
In leading the trial court into error of law, Hi-Line
relied heavily on the Michigan case referred to in HiLine's memorandum, General Accident Fire and Life
Assur. Corp. v. Sircey, 354 Mich. 478, 93 N.W. 2d 315.
Aside from the harsh and inequitable result of that case,
there are several important distinctions which show
General Indemnity v. Sircey, should not be persuasive
as a precedent in this case.
First, the evils and weaknesses that flowed from the
historic separation of law and equity jurisdictions resulted in reform in many states, Utah included.
"There shall be but one form of civil action,
and law and equity may be administered in the
same action." Constitution of Utah, Art. VIII,
Sec. 19.
In l\fichigan that reform has not been made, and
General Accident v. Sircey was decided on the law side,
and equitable considerations were specifically excluded
from the decision. The law side applied a strict, rigid and
inflexible rule against splitting a cause of action, disregarding the equitable principles \Yhich produce exceptions or contrary rules in other jurisdictions.
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Tht· itnportuneP of the fact that General Accident v.
S ircry ea~P \ra~ triPd at la,,~, and not in equity, can be
~"t'll hv
. the l':u·t that an entirPlv. different rule regarding
~plitting of eau~t·s of action is applied in the equity
('ourt~ in ~lichigan. In LaBour r. J.l!ichigan r.;'at. Bank,
335 ~I ich. ~~)S, 3;> ~. \Y. ~d 838, respondent had previously
~ttt•d and <'ollPeh•d a judg1nent against one Hunt on one
eount of a elaiin, but thL· other count was dismissed. Later
Hunt "·pnt into bankruptcy, the bank sued again on the
~t·eond count, and collected a verdict. Hunt's trustee, the
uppPllant, sPt up the judgment in the former suit as a bar
to a judg1nent in the second action. The court sitting in
ehntH'Pry denied the defense, saying:
1

HThe rule against splitting a cause of action
is not a hard and fast one in courts of equity, and
\\·ill not be enforced there unless justice requires
its application in the particular case. * * *" (55
x.,,TO ~d 838 at page 840.)
~econd,

the first trial in Michigan resulted in a deft~n~P Yerdict, 'vith the issues of negligence and causation
in defendanfs favor. In the Salt Lake County action the
oppo~ite is true, and defendant's negligence admittedly
i~ the ~olt> proxi1nate cause of the damage.
Third, the decision in General Accident v. Sircey
appear~ to rest upon a specific Michigan statute, Sec.
61~.:2. 'vhich is apparently interpreted to mean that the
a~~ignee shall intervene in an action brought by the
a~~ ignor in tort. This reasoning is buttressed by the
f:H·t that a scttlen1ent. not a judgn1ent, by the assignor
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in Wolverine Ins. ()o. v. Klouzparcns, 273 ~lich. -!93, ~();~
N.W. 724 (1935) for part of the property damages, vvas
not a bar to the insurance company's assignee's bringing
an action for the remainder of the property damage claim
which \vas assigned to it.
Fourth, the J\Iiehigan court in its opinion gave stress
to the fact that the plaintiff had not sustained its burden
of proof on the custom among insurance companies to
acquiesce in the separate settlement of subrogation
clain1s. Unlike the Michigan case, in this appeal such a
custom is admitted.
Fifth, the Michigan court considered that the appellee had not requested the appellant to delay in asserting
its subrogation claim. The facts in the instant case require a different finding.
D. Hi-Line's memorandum upon which the trial
court based its erroneous adoption of the defendant's
contentions consists generally of quotations lifted out
of context, \Yhich do not apply to the type of factual
situation here involved. ~fany of the general rules quoted
by the defendant, in their proper application, may be
a shield against injustice. The defendant here tries to
convert the shield into a sword to be used for an unjust,
unconscionable and inequitable purpose, the evasion of
clear liability through the good faith reliance of the
appellant induced by the representation of the defendant's agent.
~Iany

of Hi-Line's citations in its memorandum are
sin1pl~~ inapplicable. In the case of Mads en v. Mads en,
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7~

l"tnh 9(i, ~fi91).1:~:! (19:!0), eitPd hy defendant involved
lllPrPly a pleading quP~tion in a trover action and in no
way involvPd a holding supporting the defendant's position in thi~ <·asP.
In thP <·a~P of ~._','nlith 'l:. Lenzi, 7--! (Ttah 362, 279 P. 893
( lD:.!~)) involvPd an objection by a defendant because a
t•lnitn l'or pPrsoiutl injury "·as not separated from a cause
of H<'tion for property damage caused in the same accidPnt. ThP languagP of the court there is inapplicable or
JnPn· <li<'hnn so far as this case is concerned, for in the
~1nith case the situation of an insurance subrogee and
thP o\\·ner of the property was not involved. The case
h- not in point.
The rPfl'rPnCl' to Joyce v. J.llurphy Land Company,
:;;)Idaho 549. ~OS P. 241 (1922) does not appear to be in
}lni.nt. In that ea8P there had been a previous decree betwPPn thP ~arne parties dealing with the same subject
tnattt·r, 'vnter rights, and the case does not involve an
in8uranre-subrogation situation.
t'aH·

of Iou·a

natioual 1llutual Insurance
7

ComJUIII.If r. lluntlc,lf, IS \\"'"yo. 380, 328 P.2d 569 (1958), refPtTPd to in defendant'~ Ineinorandum of authorities contnint~d ~tnte1nent~ \\·hich, "·hen considered in connection
"·ith their context and the factual situation, are clearly
inapplicable to the present situation. There the insurer's
:'llhrngation clain1 "·as in fact included in the first suit,
and not on1itted by agreement of the parties as in the
pr~:'t·nt ease. The denial of the second suit involving the
The
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very same item of damage previously litigated clearly
distinguishes that case from the instant case.

The case of Cederloff v. Whited, 110 Utah 45, 1()9
P. 2d 777 ( 1946) may be clearly distinguished from the
present action, for in that instance the claim of the subrogee \vas included in the suit \Vherein the property
owner sought recovery of his damages, and not excluded
as here. The contention of the defendant that the subrogation claim must be excluded was rejected. The case
also involved no actions by the defendant's agent to mislead the subrogee, and a completely different factual situation, and different questions of law and equity.
The holding of Kidd v. Hillman, 14 Cal. App. 2d 507,
58 P. 2d 6·62 (19H6) cited by defendant, proper on its
peculiar facts, is inapplicable to the present case, where
the facts and the equities differ so radically. Kidd v.
Iiillrnan involved a fraudulent attempt to collect twice
for the same items of damage.
As might be expected, the broad language of that
case has been restricted and distinguished in connection
''Tith later California cases involving differing factual
situations.
See Board of Adn1iuistration, etc., v. Ames, 29 Cal.
Rptr. 917 (June 12, 1963) Subrogee allo\ved recovery
after tortfeasor paid insured.
U.S. v. Standard Oil Co., 60 F. Supp. 807 (S.D. Calif.
19-±5) separate recovery allowed for medical expenses
after tortfeasor paid injured person.
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~Yicnuuu1. 17 ( 1al. 2d 563, 110 ]>. 2d

lU~j ( 19-l-1) rl\ro ~PparatP

recoveries allowed.

Conunerl'ial Staudard In:::;. ( 0. v. Winfield, et al.,
(l'al. 1~l:~s). 7;) P. 2d ;)~3. rrortfPasor held to have ''Taived
dPt'Pn~,. ag-ainst ~plitting a cause of action.
1

l n sununary it i::; clear that in the case of an insur-

ant·e subrogation situation, recognition of the peculiar

p robletn is necPssary. Although the jurisdictions do not
all a~rPP in their language or in their theory, practically
all do tnake allo'\vance for the problem peculiar to the
~ituation, either by holding that there are two causes
of aet ion, or that there is an exception to the general
rule against splitting a cause of action, or that there is
t·~toppel preventing the assertion of the defense against
~plitting a cause of action, or that there is a consent or
waiver pertnitting the separate handling of the right of
thP property o\\Tner and the right of the subrogee.
POINT TWO
THE SALT LAKE COUNTY kCTION OF DONALD RAY:\IER VS. HI-LINE TRANS·PORT, INC., IS NOT RES JUDICAT A ON THE CLAIM OF PLAINTIFF MILLER~S' INSURANCE ASSOCIATION ..

Plaintiff ~lillers' Mutual Insurance Association was
not a party to the Salt Lake County action. Plaintiff
aequired its subrogation right and was the owner of the
claiin for $:2G-!:2.UO prior to Raymer's suit in Salt Lake
l,ounty. and Raymer did not own that claim.
.Even as

bet"~een

parties to the same action it is held
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that estoppel of judgment does not extend to an issue not
expressly put in issue and litigated to the first action.
Itay v. Consolidated l?reightways, -! Utah 2d 137, 289 P.
2d 196 (19·55).
Res judicata would not extend further against a
non-party. Not only was Millers' Mutual Insurance Assn.
not joined as_ a party in the Salt Lake County suit, but
the existence and amount of Millers' claim, and Millers'
right to make recovery were not placed in issue or litigated in the first action.
The issues in this action were not joined in the Salt
Lake County action with the knowledge and consent of,
and at the request of Hi-Line and its authorized representatives.
Hi-Line observed and well knew the destruction of
the new Buick exceeded the $50.00 deductible asked by
Raymer and was on notice of the subrogation claim. The
complaint served on Hi-Line gave it further notice. Central Casualty and Homer Bray S-ervice, Inc., to whom
Hi-Line had entrusted the authority and responsibility
for negotiating the claims, had detailed and specific
kno\v"ledge of the subrogation claim, and that knowledge
is i1nputed to the principal, Hi-Line Transport, Inc. As
agents they negotiated \Vith the subrogee and procured
the forebearance and delay of plaintiff in pressing its
claim, the better to allow Hi-Line's representatives to defend I-Ii-Line in Raymer's Salt Lake ·County suit.
The subrogation claim was not included in the Salt
Lake County suit,. and Hi-Line and its representatives
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\n·ll kru·w ~tH•ei t'ienlly that it "·as otnitted. Hi-Line knew
thP Jlt•w lluiek \Vas de1noli~hed, and that the $50.00 asked
hy Hayrnt•r \vas only his deductible, that a subrogation
,·lainl \Vas outstanding, and the specific knowledge of the
n.~Pnt ot' lli-Line authorized to conduct negotiations is
ilnputable to lli-Line.
~ineP

thP rights of l\lillers' l\lutual Insurance Association werP not n1ade an issue in or adjudicated by the Salt
l.akt~ County aetion, Millers' Mutual Insurance Association ~hould be giYen its day in court now. Hi-Line's att~nlpt to deny the appellant's claim a hearing on its
nwrits, after the good faith shown by appellant, is sharpdPaling.
l{pferl•nep is made to the discussion of Rule 84 of
tht· Re~tatPtnent of Judgments in Point One, pages 20-21
of thi~ brief. Under the Restatement the most application
the ~alt Lake County action would have as res judicata
in thi~ aetion \Vould be a determination adverse to HiLine of the issues of negligence and proximate cause, a
re~ ult in harmony \Yith the stipulation. Under Section
"~ (h) of R.Pstatement of Judgments the ownership and
nrnount of the plaintiff's subrogation claim would not
hP re~ judicata. Spargur v. Dayton Power & Light Co.
\8Upra).
South Dakota rejected res judicata as a defense in an
in~nrance-subrogation situation where two suits were
filed against a tortfeasor, one for damage to cargo, and
ont• for drunage to the truck damaged in the same accirlPnt. Sodak Distributing Co. r. TTTayne, 77 S.D. 496, 93
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N. W. :2d 791 ( 1958). The insured first instituted an action
for damages to his truck. The insurer-subrogee then
instituted a separate action for damaged cargo. In both
actions, respondent \Yas represented by the same counsel,
as were insured and insurer. The insurer's case reached
judgment first, and the insurer collected damages for the
damaging of the cargo. Respondent's counsel then raised
the defense of res judicata in the suit of the insured. The
trial court recognized this defense and was reversed. On
appeal, all judges concurred in rejecting the defense of
res judicata in the case of insurance subrogations, although South Dakota otherwise adheres strictly to the
rule against splitting of claims. The court stated its
reasons for allowing such an exception as follows:

"The practices of insuring against the dangers of financial liability inherent in modern living has enjoyed a phenomenal growth in tlH· last
decade or two. In fact, in many quarters it is regarded as a device by \vhich an individual shares
such risks \Yith others. This development is <'Y~'n
more pronounced 'vhere motor vehicles are involved. As to them publie liability and property
dan1age insurance coverage is required in many
states by law. It seems to us that the rule \Ve have
adopted is attuned to this condition. See Under\vood v. Dooley, 197 N.C. 100, 1±7 S. E. 686, 64
A.L.R. 65,6. Those jurisdictions which do not recognize the exception do so principally on the
ground that the defendant should not be .subjected to more than one suit by reason of a ~nngle
tort However, in this connection it should be noted
that the development of the insurance concept has
had an i1npact on such defendants. The burdens
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of their status arc uo1r iurr('asiugly assllJncd by
insurers." (93 N.W. 2d 791 at page 794.)
POINT THREtE

EVEN HAD DEFENDANT-RESPONDENT ANY RIGHT
TO HAVE PLAINTIFF'S SUBROGATION CLAJM TRIED IN
THE SALT LAKE COUNTY ACTION RATHER T'HAN SEP ARATELY, DEFENDANT- RESPONDENT WAIVED SUCH
RIGHT BY INDUCING PLAINTIFF TO WITHHOLD LEGAL
ACTION .
..:\~~tuning

for the purpose of argument that defendnut did have the right to have the subrogation action
triPtl in thP Salt ·L.ake County action with Raymer's claim
for p~r~onal injury and $50.00 deductible, Hi-Line still
~hould not Pscape its liability to plaintiff. It gave
authority and responsibility to Central Casualty and the
adju~tt~r, Homer Bray Service, Inc., to adjust, investigate
and defPnd the accident and resulting claims.
~Liller~·

put the question squarely and specifically
to Hi-Line's designated agents in the letter in Record 27,
~tating in substance: Will you honor our claim on its
nterits later·? Tell us now because if you will not honor
our elai1n later \\·e 'Yill sue now.
lTnder a duty to give a clear answer to such a question, Hi-Line's representative said in substance: You do
not n~Pd to sue no,v. Please wait until later. We will
honor your clain1 separately on its merits after the personal injury action is disposed of.
~~

l)aragraph three of the Court's Conclusions of Law
contrary to the facts and the la,v. The letters of
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Ho1ner Bray Service, Inc., and ~Iillers' ~l utual InsuraneP
Association (Record 27 and 28) show that Homer Bray
Service, Inc., acting as agent for the ·TortfeasorRespondent, induced Millers' ~lutual Insurance Association to refrain from setting forth the subrogation claim
in the Salt Lake County litigation, and waived any defense of res judicata or splitting a cause of action. Millers' l\futual Insurance Association advised Homer Bray
by a letter of February 17, 1961, "In the absence of some
assurance that Central ·Casualty will consider our subrogation claim after the other cases are out of the way, we
will naturally be forced to take other action to protect
our interest."
In reply Homer Bray Service, Inc. stated: ''You are
correct. We have not been able to dispose of the injury
claims and when they are out of the way we will certainly
be ntore than happy to give your subrogation claim conside ration." D·oes that language indicate that when the
injury claims are out of the way that ~fillers' can expect
to have the claims of res judicata, splitting a cause of action, asserted f Quite the contrary is true. The Homer
Bray letter also said: " ... and we shall appreciate receiving photostatic copy of your proof of loss together
"rith draft in payment." Why would the agent for the
Tortfeasor-Respondent entrusted with the responsibility
for the negotiation of the subrogation claim request a
photostatic copy of the proof of loss and the draft in payInent if the claimed defenses of res judicata and splitting a cause of action "\Yere to be asserted~ The clear
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~tntl•lllt'llt hy t1H' agPnt for thP Tortfeasor-Respondent

wlH'Il thP injury clainu.; \\·Pre out of the way "we will
certainly hP tnon' thnn happy to give your subrogation
··lniln <·on:.- i<lPrat ion'' and requesting copies of the proof
of lP:-'~ and t hP paytnent draft by the subrogee can mean
only that th~ Tortfeasor consented that the subrogation
twtion be dPalt "·ith separately, and that the subrogee
would not be prejudiced by virtue of its cooperation, for
which llotner Bray Service, Inc., so warmly thanked
tlw ~ubrogee in its letter of February 22, 1961.
tl1at

To allo'v the Tortfeasor to repudiate that waiver and
havP the benefit of the third ·Conclusion of Law would be
to eonvPrt a shield for use in appropriate cases to a
~word for defrauding Millers' Mutual Insurance Association of its elai1n for damage caused by the negligence of
thP Tortfeasor.
.. . . . It has been held that a wrongdoer, by
his action, 1nay acquiesce in the splitting of causes
of action for injuries and property damage resulting from the same collision." Appleman on Insurance,,.,. ol. 6, § 4092, pages 584-586.
HTort-feasors making settlement with injured
person \vith full knowledge of prior payment
1nade injured person by his collision insurer acquiesced in splitting of causes of action for injurie~ and for property damage resulting from
collision." Wolrerine Ins. Co. v. Klomparens 1935
'
'
~63 X.\\T. 7:2-!, 273 :Jiich. 49.3.
··Prohibition against splitting a cause of action is for
th(l benefit of the defendant and he may \\""aive or renounce it by agreement." In facts ahnost identical to the
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instant case, the request of the tortfeasor's liability insurance company that the subrogee forbear in intervening
in personal injury action, was held to be binding on the
tortfeasor as waiver of the defense against splitting a
cause of action, and the tortfeasor \\~as estopped from
asserting such a defense in a later action by the subrogee.
Commercial Standard Ins. Co. v. Winfield, et al. (Calif.
1938) 75 P. 2d 525.
McCaffrey v. Wiley, (Calif., 19'51) 230 P. 2d 152, 155
stated:

"It has been held that the prohibition against
splitting of an action does not apply 'vhere the
particular issue was specifically withdrawn or
reserved for future litigation in the prior action.
Coburn v. Goodall, 72 ·Cal. 498, 14 P. 190; Panos
v. Great Western Packing Co., 21 Cal. 2d 636,
134 P. 2d 242, 2-!-±."
It is not necessary that a tortfeasor personally do
the act 'vhich constitutes waiver of a defense. The acts
of the insurance company and its adjusters are binding
upon the insured. The act of the adjuster as agent may
estop the tortfeasor from asserting a defense.
Phillips v. Alston, 257 N.~C. 255, 125 S.E. 2d 580
held that notice to an adjuster for defendant's insurance
carrier was notice binding upon defendant.

" ( T) he adjuster for defendants' insurance
carrier 'vas on notice of the subrogation rights of
An1erican Security Insurance ~Co., and . . . this
kno'v ledge of said adjuster is imputed to defendant... " (125 S.E. 2d 580 at page 582).
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"lh·t'Pndant ('OiltPIHl~ hi~ liability insurance
carri(·r \Vas \rithout authority to act for him in
tnaking the ~PttlPlllPnt "·ith and taking a releasP
fro1n l'hillip~ ... (Citations) 1Le Inisapprehends
tht· purport of those decisions. True, a liability
<·arrier <·aniH>t i1npair the rights of the insured
hy ~Pttling his rlai1n 'vithout his authority. No
suggestion is made here that defendant lost any
rights by the sPttlPHtPnt. To the contrary he assPrts right~ n·sulting fro1n the settlement. ,,. .hen
he does so, he ratifies the aet of the person making the ~Ptt lPinent. He cannot accept the benefits
and reJect the obligations." (125 S.E. 2d 580 at
pages 583-584; emphasis added.)
,'-,'fl/J.If r.

T icfuria 11/iHcs, 12-! ~lont. 321, 221 P. 2d 423
7

(lHrlO) has Inany close similarities to the instant case. It
was h~ld that .Jl r. Dobler, adjuster for defendants' insuratH'P eontpnny. \ras the agent of the defendant so as to
hind d~fendnnt to pay plaintiff's claim.

The language in defendants' policy authorizing the
in~nraneP co1npany to investigate, negotiate and defend
the elaiiu i~ yery silnilar to Hi-Line's policy. Defendant
by it~ actions entrusted the negotiation to the insurance
enntpan~· ju~t a~ Hi-Line did. The adjuster, like Homer
Bray ~t'rYice. Inc .. \Vrote to plaintiff's attorney, HI do
not fPPl that 1 ran take any responsibility so far as the
drunagt· to ~[r. ~lPhy·~ (the plaintiff) car is concerned
until thL' question of personal injury claims have been
dt~t(lrinined."

"'The action is based upon the promises made
by ~Ir. Dobler. the adjuster for the insurance company, the plaintiff alleging that the defendant
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was bound by such promises and the defendant
denying that nlr. Dobler represented the defendant corporation, and alleging that Mr. Dobler's
promises, if any, \Vere made on behalf of the
Standard Accident Insurance Company, and not
on behalf of the defendant corporation." (221 P.
2d at page 424.)
In holding that the adjuster's pro1nises and representations were binding upon the tortfeasor-defendant,
the Supreme Court of Montana quoted the following
language:
"He cannot turn over to an insurer the whole
management of the subject of settlements in his
behalf and accept the benefit of the insurer's efforts when they are successful and relieve him
from liability but repudiate their consequences
when they affect his defense adversely. It is no
answer to say the company acts in its own behalf,
and that the defendant cannot control its conduct.
It does act in its o"Tn behalf, but it also acts
in behalf of the defendant to the extent of his
interest in the defense, although by the terms of
th·e contract the company may exercise its own
judgment to its own advantage uncontrolled by
the defendant." (Id. at page 427.)
In the case of Keller v. K eklikian, Mo., 244 S.W. 2d
1001 ( 1951) an insured turned over to his insurance company a suit against hi1n arising out of an accident and
the adjuster for the insurance company entered into a
stipulation releasing the insured's claims against the
other party. Under those circumstances the Supre1ne
Court of 1\lissouri held that the insured was bound by
the action of the insurance adjuster on the grounds that
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the ,·oiHpany and its adjustPrs and la"~yers were the autllori~Pd n.gPnts of the i11sur('d and acted for and in his
hPhalf.
/)urk r. 1lloornutn Jlfg. C'o., 1~1 Utah 339, 241 P. 2d
!tl~ ut pag(' ~~19 <'itPs ,,·ith approval Mechem on Agency,
~,.,.t ion 17S 1 :

"\Yhe rever the doing of a certain act or the
t ransnetion of a given affair or the performance
of eertain business is confided to an agent, the
authority to so act will, in accordance with a genPral rule often referred to, carry "\Yith it by implication the authority to do all of the collateral
acb; ,,·hich are the natural and ordinary incidents
o fthe main act or business authorized.
"
POINT FOUR
DEFENDANT-RESPONDENT-TORTFEASO·R IS ESTOPPED TO ASSERT CLAIMED DEFENSE1S OF &ES JUDICATA
AND SPLITTING OF A ~CAUSE OF ~CTION.

That the negligence of Hi-Line Transport, Inc., was
th(\ sole proximate cause of damage in the stipulated
runount to the plaintiff is agreed. The liability of the def,·udant is clear in fact and extent. The general question
which defendat raises in defense in this action is "\vhether
th{' ~nh~equent actions of the defendant's representatives,
and the ~nbsequent actions of the plaintiff performed in
relianel~ upon the actions of defendant's representatives,
"·ill ano,y the defendant to escape its clear liability.
Defendant seeks to escape liability by adopting and
relying- upon the action of defendant's representatives,
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Ho1ner Bray Service, Inc., and the actions of the plaintiff induced thereby.
The power of this court includes equity as well as
la\v, and the decision of the issues presented by this
appeal properly involves the application of equitable
principles as well as legal principles.
The defendant should be estopped to assert the alleged defenses of res judicata and splitting of a cause of
action. To raise those defenses Hi-Line must necessarily
adopt and rely upon the actions of defendant's representatives. Those actions induced the plaintiff in good
faith to refrain from joining its claim in the Salt Lake
County action.
The actions of an insurance adjuster for a liability
carrier were held to estop the insured under a liability
policy from asserting the defense of the statute of limitations. In MacKeen v. Kasinskas, Mass., 132 N.E. 2d 732
( 1956), the representation of the adjuster that the plaintiff \vould not need to bring suit to recover induced the
plaintiff to let the statute of limitations run. The court
stated:
· "The sole question presented to us is ·w'hether
the evidence would warrant a finding that the
defendant was estopped from setting up the statute as a defense by reason of the conduct of one
Hughes, an adjuster for an insurance company
'vhich had issued a certificate . . . covering the
auton1obile operated by the defendant. There w·as
no error. * * *
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,,rrhP plaintiffs ('ontPnd that becaust' of these
rPpr(·~untations of llughP~ they \\'Pre induced to
rPt'rain fro1n consulting a lawyer and from instituting a ~uit to l'('eov<.•r for their injuries. They
a~~Pit that, by rPason of this conduct of the adju~h·r, thP clefPndant and the company which cov•·n·d thP auto1nobile she \\·as operating are estopl H'(l from ~Ptting up the statute of limitations. We
ag-rc·•· ,,·ith this contention .

. . . "'The only authority which the agent need
have to constitute his conduct an estoppel is the
authority to pron1ise a settlement. It is clear that
all insuraneP adjusters have at least apparent
authority to 1nake promises of settlement. 'The
prineipal function of insurance company adjustPrs is to determine the liability of the insured
and to 1nake arrangements for settling claims. . .
··In ~lcLearn v. Hill, supra, 276 Mass. at page
;l:2-t, 177 N.E. at page 619, it was said that it was
not necessary to charge deceit, bad faith or actual
fraud. ·Facts falling short of these elements may
eon~titute contrary to general principles of fair
dealing and to the good conscience which ought to
actuate individuals and \Yhich it is the design of
eon rts to enforce. It is in the main to accomplish
the 1n·pvention of results contrary to good con~eience and fair dealing that the doctrine of estoppel ha~ been formulated and taken its place
a~ a part of the la\Y.' We think that the facts set
forth in the case at bar bring it \\Tithin the doctrine
of estoppel as thus defined." (132 N.E. 2d 732 at
ragps 733-734.)
~t'P al:-'n Connnercial Standard Ins. Co. v. Winfield

et al (supra) (Calif. 1938) 73 P. 2d 3:23~ W"here in a factual
~ituation practically identical to this case on appeal, the
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tortfeasor \vas held estopped to assert against a subrogee
the defense against splitting a cause of action because
of the request by the liability carrier that the subrogee
not intervene in the personal injury action.
No Utah case has been found involving identical
facts .. The case of Badger v. Badger, 69 Utah 29,3, ~G.f
Pac. 784 ( 1927) did however clearly recognize the principle that a person may be estopped from asserting a
defense by reason of conduct for which that party is responsible. Badger v. Badger was a divorce matter and
the f~cts are dissimilar, but the principle is very much
in point. Headnote 3, page 293 of 69 Utah, summarizes
the rule as follows :
"While generally a party cannot split a single
demand into separate causes of action, if by accident, excusable neglect, 1nistake, or fraud by his
adversary, and \vithout pleaders fault, he splits
single cause of action, adjudication in respect to
one will not bar suit on the other."
Again, in a very different factual situation, the Suprerne Court of Utah recognized that one may not accept the beneficial portion of his agent's actions and reject the detrimental part. Moses v. Archie MacFarland
Company;119 Utah 602, 230 P. 2d 271 (1951). The court
there held also that the principal may not avoid ratifying
his agent's actions by remaining willfully ignorant or
shutting his eyes to information.
The respondent's arguments on limitations on the
authority of a liability carrier as agent are not appli-
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t•ahh· to this ~ituntion. Such li1nitations are intended to
pn·vPnt thP agent fro1n acting prejudicially toward the
io~un·d by ad1nitting liability ""here a question of liability exi~t~, or by admitting thP amount of damages
whert• dntnagP~ are unliquidated and disputed in amount.
Thi~ <·on~ideration is absent in the instant case where
linhility is undi~puted and stipulated, and where the
nn1ount of damages is liquidated and undisputed. The
dllfPndant-torfeasor-respondent here is really asserting
that his agent, the insurance adjuster, had the power to
tni~lt~ad the plaintiff-subrogee to the subrogee's detriDlPnt, and to confer a benefit upon the tortfeasorn\~pondent by extinguishing the tortfeasor's existing li~
bility to thP subrogee. No problem of exceeding authority
really Pxi~ts. The tortfeasor-defendant here seeks to
ratify and profit by the actions of the agent where benefirial to the tortfeasor, and divorce itself from any of the
obligations or disadvantageous consequences arising
fron1 the agent's acts. The tortfeasor-respondent's position boil~ down to this: the tortfeasor asks the court to
conf~r an unjust enrichment upon the tortfeasor by extingui~hing the liability of the tortfeasor to the subrogee,
heean~tl of the tortfeasor's agents induced the subrogee
to refrain from bringing suit by the assurance that the
~ubrogation claim would be dealt with on its merits upon
eonelusion of Raymer's personal injury action in Salt
l.ake County.
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POINT FIVE
PLAIN'TIFF-APPELLAN'T IS ENTITLED TO JUDGMENT AGAINST DEFENDANT-RlErSPO·NDENT AS PRAYED
IN COMPLAINT FOR DAMAGES AS STIPULATED.

Since it is stipulated that the negligence of Hi-Line
Transport, Inc. \\Tas the sole proximate cause of darnage
paid by plaintiff in the sum of $2:642.00 it follows that
Plaintiff-Subrogee is entitled to judgment as prayed in
the complaint, together with costs.
When the negligence of the defendant produced the
damage the plaintiff became liable to Raymer for the
arnount actually paid by the plaintiff, and in turn there
arose a clear, unmistakable liability of the defendant to
the plaintiff for $2642.00.
It "\Vould indeed be a distortion of justice and equity
to rP\\Tard Hi-Line by relieving it of liability, and puni~h
thP plaintiff by depriving plaintiff of its just dues lwcause the defendant's representatives induced the plaintiff to refrain from joining in the Salt 1Lake County legal
action. Plaintiff would have joined in that action had it
not been for the assurances of defendant's agents, in the
letter in the Record, page :28. .A.cting in good faith, the
plaintiff refrained frorn joining that action upon the
clear representation of Homer Bray Service, Inc. in
8tating ( Reeord :28) ""You are correct. \Y- e have not been
able is dispose of the injury claims and when they are
out of the "\vay "\Ye will certainly be more than happy to
giy·p )Tour subrogation claims consideration." To now
allo,,. the defendant to repudiate the acts of its repre-
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:--•·nhttiYPS aftPr <·au~ing and allo,Ying then1 to act in its
behalf. b{\enusP dPfendant has obtained the advantage
t'rotu tht'i r rPpresPntation and no'v \\'ishes to repudiate
tlw disadvantages of that representation, would be a reward and t'ncourngenH'nt of fraud and unconscienable
dtaling .
.\ dPei~ion for plaintiff "~ill be good public policy.
Fi r:-;t, it is g(lnerally recognized that appellate courts
tuu~t hP alert to assure that all classes of litigants, in~urnn('P cotnpani(:ls included, receive no more and no less
thnn a fair and impartial application of law and equity.
,) uriP~ and judges should accord an insurance company
nPither tnore nor less than a fair 1neasure of justice.
RecPivership of Central Casualty ·C·ompany is a
renlinder that insurance companies do not represent an
inexhaustible supply of wealth, and that public interest
rPqui rP~ that solvency of insurers be protected by:
a. Fair treatment of insurers in litigation, 'vithout
prejudice because they are insurance companies.
h. Permitting subrogation recovery fro1n responsihk tortfea~ors in appropriate cases by a fair application
of e~tahlished rules concerning liability and damages.
e. Encouraging traffic safety by legal imposition
of financial responsibility for loss on those whose negligence ~auses the loss.
~t.\eond.

much litigation is avoided by the practice
ot' insurance con1panies in ""'ithholding suit on subro-
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gation claims to await settle1nent or othPr disposition of
personal injury claims. \ v· ere the companies, in order to
protect their interest, rPquired to file suit rather than
''rait on such claims, n1uch additional litigation \Vould
be filed in the courts, and the process of amicable negotiation and settlement \Yould be discouraged and hanlpered.
The judgment should be reversed with directions to
enter judgment for plaintiff as prayed.
Respectfully submitted,

J. ROYAL ANDREAS.E.N
Attorney for Plaintiff-Appellant

914-916 Kearns Building
Salt Lake City, Utah
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